Ethical Practice in Prenatal Screening - Can Informed Consent Deliver? by Milligan, Eleanor
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethical Practice in Prenatal Screening – 
Can Informed Consent Deliver? 
 
 
 
 
Eleanor Milligan 
School of Humanities and Human Services 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented to the Social Change in the 
21st Century Conference 
 
Centre for Social Change Research 
Queensland University of Technology 
29 October 2004 
 
 
 
 
*Winner -  Best Paper by an Emerging Researcher 2004 
 1
Ethical Practice in Prenatal Screening – Can Informed 
Consent Deliver? 
 
Eleanor Milligan 
 
Applied Ethics and Human Rights Programme 
Queensland University of Technology 
 
Abstract 
 
As the technological capacity to diagnose certain conditions prenatally 
expands, and more asymptomatic women are exposed to routine forms of 
prenatal screening, increasing emphasis is being placed on the garnering of 
informed consent within existing testing regimes to confer ethical 
legitimisation to this routine medical intervention. But while the garnering of 
informed consent has been incorporated into prenatal routines, recent studies 
show that for most women the purpose, practicalities and potential outcomes 
of the tests they have ‘consented’ to are poorly understood. Indeed most have 
simply followed the prescribed normative pathway without question. These 
findings contradict assertions of ‘informed’ engagement and thus cast doubt 
on the ethical validity of the currently accepted protocols. Closer consideration 
of the underlying assumptions of autonomy, on which informed consent is 
based reveals that the individualistic notions embedded do not reflect the 
relational way in which people interact. When applied in a context that offers 
few educational opportunities to become truly informed and which is 
unresponsive to the social, institutional and personal constraints experienced, 
the mere layering of  ‘informed consent’ onto existing, unchallenged regimes 
is failing to achieve ethically coherent outcomes. Clearly, the current situation 
is proving to be an inadequate platform from which to build ethically sensitive 
responses to the complex ethical issues at stake in an increasingly 
technological world. With recent history of antenatal care showing how quickly 
new technologies are embraced often before their clinical or societal 
implications are clear, ensuring ethically responsive practices into the 21st 
century demands further consideration now, with a re-thinking of how 
genuinely informed consent may be achieved.  
 
Key Words: prenatal screening; informed consent; communicating risk; 
autonomy; ethics 
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Introduction 
Once reserved for only “high risk” pregnancies, prenatal screening has now become 
a routine feature of antenatal care in most first world countries with up to 90% of 
women receiving some form of testing during pregnancy (Dormandy.E, Hooper.R, 
Michie.S, & Marteau.T.M., 2002; Lippman, 1991). Widely regarded as a means of 
increasing reproductive choices through enhanced knowledge and more informed 
decision making, prenatal screening is seen by parents and doctors alike as 
unproblematic, even “responsible pregnant behaviour”. However, emerging research 
in this field suggests that rather than actively seeking this knowledge and 
incorporating it into an informed choice decision making process, many women 
simply follow a prescribed normative pathway, effectively making ‘choices’ by default 
and unquestioningly accepting the entrenched routine (Press & Browner, 1997). 
Indeed, most are unable to articulate the purpose, potential problems or processes of 
the testing they have participated in. (Markens, Browner, & Press, 1999; Press & 
Browner, 1997; Stapleton, Kirkham, & Thomas, 2002; Williams, Alderson, & 
Farsides, 2002a). These findings strongly contradict assertions of “informed” 
engagement and thus cast doubts on the ethical integrity of this routine medical 
intervention.  
 
Clearly, the mere incorporation of an ‘informed consent’ criterion into existing 
practices is not enhancing knowledge or understanding. But why is informed consent 
falling short of our high expectations? Perhaps the root of this problem lies at the 
founding principle of autonomy on which consent is based. The principle of autonomy 
is deeply embedded in common moral theory and is essentially typified as self rule 
which is free from interference or limitation. Generally, freedom from control and the 
capacity to act intentionally are the defining criteria (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). 
In the institutional health care setting, the express giving of consent by the patient 
has come to reflect the incorporation of respect for autonomy into existing practices, 
and so ‘consent’ has become synonymous with ethically sensitive intervention. More 
recently the notion of informed consent has emerged with most medical and research 
codes of practice dictating that the informed consent of a patient must be obtained 
prior to any intervention. Generally the five basic tenets of informed consent are 
recognised as: 1) Competence of the patient to decide, 2) Disclosure of all relevant 
information, 3) Comprehension and understanding by the patient, 4) Voluntariness of 
participation and 5) Consent, given actively without interference (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2001). These points would then incorporate issues such as the purpose of 
the screening, the possibility of positive and negative results, the medical risk 
associated with the procedure and discussion of any important medical, social or 
financial implications resulting from the screening.  
 
But while these standards are firmly entrenched in bioethical discourse as ideal 
ethical outcomes, increasingly social research suggests that few of these principles 
are actually met in practice. Rather they are frequently compromised by the 
embedded and relational nature of decision-making and the constraints of the clinical 
setting in which the decisions are taken. And so, despite the liberal use of terms such 
as choice, autonomy and informed consent within the literature, in reality a person’s 
ability to exercise free choice is constrained by the social and institutional context in 
which their decisions are made (Lippman, 1999). Because the autonomous self is 
embedded in relationships with others, power dynamics evolve which impact on that 
persons’ ability to act autonomously in the traditional sense. The question of power 
dynamics then is not purely philosophical or ethical, but rather a well established 
observation of social science inquiry (Sherwin, 2001) and it is these very real power 
dynamics that compromise autonomy in a relational sense. Therefore, the legitimacy 
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of reliance on ‘informed consent’ to facilitate the genuine ethical collaboration based 
on current understandings begs further examination.  
 
 
Constraints on Choice 
 
 
Several mechanisms have emerged as restricting genuine informed consent and 
exercising authentic choice as women decided whether to embark on the prenatal 
screening journey. These factors include 
 
1. Personal constraints resulting from narrow interpretations of autonomy and 
choice, poor understanding of medical terms such as ‘risk’ and the perceived 
‘need’ to be re-assured. 
 
2. Institutional constraints such as the routine nature of testing, power 
dynamics within institutional settings, overt and covert counselling and trust in 
the medical system, science and technology.  
 
3. Social constraints such as societal and peer expectations of  “responsible 
pregnant behaviour”, feelings of blame and responsibility if a disabled child is 
undetected (Marteau & Drake, 1995 ),poor understanding of disability, the 
predefining of certain physical/intellectual conditions as unacceptable and 
inadequate social support for the disabled. (Bridle 2001; Brookes, 2001; 
Kenen, 1999; Lippman, 1991) 
 
 
 Personal Constraints 
 
 
The Autonomous Self and Informed Consent  
 
 
As previously mentioned, the informed consent of a patient to engage in any form of 
medical screening is generally regarded as essential for good quality, ethically robust 
health care and has been found to correlate to higher levels of acceptance of both 
positive and negative outcomes of the testing (Grover, 2003). Consequently the 
garnering of consent has become an integral part of most types of medical 
intervention including prenatal screening. In recent years the emerging emphasis on 
respect for patient autonomy as an indicator of ethical conduct has occurred in 
tandem with a cultural shift away from the benevolent paternalism of past medical 
practice, the extended use of new biomedical technologies and an increasingly 
litigious society. This focus on patient autonomy and informed consent as defined by 
and driven from within the medical community has come to serve a multitude of 
purposes. These include: 
 
• Representing ‘proof ’ that ethical practice is occurring by the incorporating 
patient ‘rights’ into administrative processes, for example, the requirement 
that consent forms to be signed, (Press & Browner, 1995)  
 
• Conferring ethical legitimisation to existing medical practices.  
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• Producing a defensive legal document lending protection to medical 
practitioners against potential lawsuits.(Press & Browner, 1995) 
 
It would seem paradoxical then that, at a time of heightened deference to the ethical 
principles of autonomy and informed consent in the biomedical discourse, recent 
research into the motivations and experiences of women participating in prenatal 
screening programmes clearly reveals a distinct lack of understanding of the testing 
they have ‘consented’ to (Markens, Browner, & Press, 1999; Press & Browner, 1997; 
Stapleton, Kirkham, & Thomas, 2002; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002a) raising 
concerns about the ethical integrity of the process. 
 
Reasons for this failure lie in part with the implicit assumptions embedded in the 
concepts of autonomy, consent and informed consent. The principle of autonomy on 
which  “consent” and ‘informed consent’ are based, rests on several underlying 
assumptions about the nature of ‘the self’ initially flowing from a modern, liberal 
perspective. According to this position, the self is seen as a rational, self- directed, 
un-encumbered, impartial being who is completely free and able to act independently 
with no relational or physical constraints (Sherwin, 1992). Thus, the autonomous self 
is essentially represented as an atomistic, detached entity. But, while this concept of 
the ‘autonomous self’ has colonised orthodox bioethical discourse, it does not reflect 
the lived reality of ‘the self’ or enhance understandings of how decisions are made. 
People do not ignore personal sentiments in moral reasoning, nor are they detached 
from sentimental consequences (Sherwin, 1992). They are intentionally partial to 
family and friends and have mutual obligations of care, responsibility, trust and 
affection. So, while an individual may consider themselves to be rational and 
independent to a degree, they are unquestionably and primarily embedded and 
embodied beings with particular roles and responsibilities that present non-negotiable 
constraints on their ability to act purely ‘autonomously’. Therefore, the goal of 
genuinely autonomous decision-making is both un-attainable and un-desirable, 
hence an inadequate basis on which to found an ethically intelligent response.  
 
Further obscuring the debate surrounding ‘consent’, ‘informed consent’ and 
‘autonomy’ are the malleable definitions and often-interchangeable use of these three 
distinctly separate concepts which obfuscates their different meanings. While 
“consent” may be defined as an active agreement to embark on a proposed course of 
treatment, increasingly it is claimed to be implied by participation alone with high 
participation rates being presented as evidence substantiating ethical conduct 
(Cuckle, 1995, 2001) . But, does participation necessarily imply active consent, or 
could it equally imply ignorance or indifference? Clearly participation alone does not 
equate to ethical engagement as the lines between consent, compliance, 
acquiescence and ignorance become blurred. 
 
Informed consent incorporates the added dimension of education and the transfer of 
knowledge prior to the bestowing of consent. “Informed consent” then is given from a 
position of understanding after careful reflection and deliberation of the relevant facts. 
However, who decides what knowledge is to be revealed, to whom and for whose 
benefit is left largely unexplored. Again, the power in this exchange rests with the 
holder of the knowledge (usually the physician) who deigns what information is 
worthy of imparting. The assumption that a person will be equipped with all relevant 
knowledge contains two implicit messages. Firstly, that good knowledge coupled with 
good reason will produce a morally acceptable result and secondly, that the person 
deciding is cognisant of what  ‘relevant’ knowledge they need, therefore aware if 
significant information is missing. The current Queensland Health (2002) consent to 
amniocentesis form provides an example of significant omissions in what might be 
considered relevant knowledge in a process where the discernment of what 
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knowledge is pertinent to the patient rests with another. Indeed this form, neglects to 
flag selective termination as one of the potential outcomes of participation. As 
termination rates after an unwelcome diagnosis edge towards 100%, it could be 
considered a likely outcome (Carothers, Boyd, Lowther, Ellis, Couzin, Faed et al., 
1999; Egan & Borgida, 2002; Ford, 1999; Santalahti, 1999), yet disclosure of this 
possibility it is not deemed to be relevant information in reaching an informed 
decision at the outset.  
 
Other assumptions implicit in the principle of autonomy are: -  
 
a) The person themselves, and not the community to which they belong are the 
final judge of the integrity of the decision made. Also that a person is 
equipped with all the relevant knowledge, and has the capacity to decide 
(including the ability to resist co-ercion). Internal barriers to choice, such as 
the need to conform to societal norms of racism, sexism for example, must 
also be absent. (Oshana, 2001) 
 
b) That real access to a variety of options actually exists, and can be readily 
accessed, otherwise choice is not an intentional act, but rather acquiescence 
to the least detrimental of several poor options. (Ibid) 
 
c) Relationships with others are supportive both psychologically and socially, 
and there is no consequence of abandonment or retaliation if a choice is 
made that others oppose. (Ibid) 
 
In response to the first point, women fulfil many roles within a community such as 
mother, partner, worker, and thus have competing responsibilities (Bridle, 2002; 
Lippman, 1999). The best outcome as a mother may be in direct conflict with the best 
outcome perceived by society at large. For example, the birth of a child with a 
disability may be viewed as an un-wanted financial drain on society or conversely as 
an event that elicits great compassion, joy, support and love within the child’s family. 
These two positions are irreconcilable, yet in deciding whether to embark on prenatal 
screening, women must balance these opposing concerns. 
 
Genuine access to a range of options is another source of contention, with the 
routine incorporation of screening obscuring the voluntary nature of participation. 
Many women interviewed in previous studies simply did not understand that refusal 
was an option, resulting in a clinical norm where it was “harder to opt out than in” 
(Press & Browner, 1993; Santalahti, 1999) while women who sought the alternative 
of non- participation felt labelled as “difficult” or “unco-operative” (Press & Browner, 
1997; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002a). This situation threatens to erode the 
validity of any consent given and calls into question the notion of choice, when 
clearly, no workable alternative is offered (Lippman, 1999). 
 
The issue of support is recognised as crucial to the ability to exercise autonomy yet 
evidence of rejection, under-funding, under-resourcing and negative portrayal of 
people with disabilities abounds, sending a subtle but powerful message about the 
worth the child in question. (Bridle 2001; Caplan, 1999; Lippman, 1991), 
 
For the reasons outlined above, it can be seen that freedom to act autonomously is 
conditional, and many of the conditions placed on freedom are difficult or impossible 
to negotiate. Therefore, the mechanical application of principles such as autonomy 
do not neatly apply to medicine in practice as “all voices are not heard, therefore, the 
moral truth does not emerge” (Tong, 2002).  
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Re-assurance, the desire to know and being ‘at risk’.  
 
 
The need for reassurance coupled with the desire to know features strongly in 
explanations women give of why they participate in prenatal screening programmes 
(Lippman, 1991; Press & Browner, 1997; Press & Browner, 1993). When this 
perceived need for reassurance is coupled with the widely expressed belief that 
knowledge cannot be harmful (Anderson, 1999; Press & Browner, 1993), a powerful 
motivation to engage in screening is formed.  Many women believe screening can 
pre-empt potential problems that may influence the type of prenatal and neonatal 
care which will ensure the best outcome for their baby, an expectation which 
contributes to feelings of reassurance (Press & Browner, 1997). The type of 
reassurance sought (or provided), however, is not specific, but rather a broad, 
general sense of comfort that the pregnancy is progressing normally (Santalahti, 
1999). Bridle (Bridle, 2002) notes paradoxically that the reassurance offered is not 
that a disabled person will be supported in the community, but rather  that a defective 
child will be identified and the “frightening outcome” of parenting a disabled child may 
then be averted (ibid). The possibility that screening may enable a preparation time, 
during which parents can come to an understanding of the special issues regarding 
their child’s needs is often overlooked, hence, the period immediately after receiving 
an unwelcome diagnosis is frequently characterised by a sense of urgency, usually 
culminating in termination of an effected foetus. However, closer consideration 
reveals that of the multitude of potential abnormalities that exist, prenatal screening 
can only identify a small proportion and even then conditions for which treatment can 
be offered are relatively few (Baird, 1999; Press & Browner, 1997). Indeed, most 
neonatal disabilities result from  “low birth weight, prematurity, viral or bacterial 
infection, birth trauma or accident” (Baird, 1999) – none of which can be predicted by 
prenatal screening. Therefore, even a welcome test result in reality offers limited 
guarantees. In light of these considerations, the ‘reassurance’ gained by the 94%-
98% of women who receive a normal test result would seem to be of limited value.  
 
Communication of ‘Risk’ 
 
Since reassurance is in reality limited, why do women perceive a need to be tested? 
Many social factors have been raised in the “construction” of this “need”. Firstly, the 
language of risk, defect and negative outcomes, (Anderson, 1999; Lippman, 1991) 
surrounding pregnancy goes some way to explaining the deeply rooted concern that 
creates a need to be re-assured . When the negative language of risk is contrasted 
against the positive expectations of improved prognosis, better medical management 
and maximised outcomes for baby, involvement in screening appears an obvious 
route to follow (Lippman, 1991). Secondly, the automatic assignation of ‘high risk’ to 
mothers over thirty five years old leads to an anxiety that inevitably ensures 
compliance with “risk lowering behaviours”, such as engaging in screening (ibid). 
 
But what do women understand by the term ‘risk’ and how do they reconcile the 
conflicting ways that ‘risk’ is presented to them during their pregnancy? For example, 
the risk of having a child with Down’s syndrome is 1 in 350 (0.29%) for a woman over 
35 years old (Down’s Syndrome Association of Queensland -DSAQ) and is 
presented as ‘high risk’. On the other hand the risk of miscarriage while undergoing 
amniocentesis to diagnose this condition is 1 in 200 (0.5%) clearly a numerically 
higher risk but one, which is presented as a low risk procedure. For women trying to 
grapple with these concepts, understandings of ‘risk’ may present an internal barrier 
to genuine choice. So, although 90 –95 % of affected children are born to mothers 
with no previous history (Baird, 1999; Press & Browner, 1997) and most children with 
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Down’s Syndrome are born to mothers under thirty five  i.e. “low risk” (DSAQ), the 
prevailing belief seems to be that pregnancy is a time of heightened risk. Thus an 
obvious and easily accessible way to reduce the perceived risk is to comply with the 
screening on offer. 
 
 
Institutional Constraints 
 
 
The Routine Nature of Screening and the “Normative’ Pathway 
 
 
Many studies reveal that the routine way in which screening is presented implicitly 
assumes consent and, therefore, obscures the voluntary nature of the proposed test 
(Lippman, 1999; Markens, Browner, & Press, 1999; Santhalahti, Hemminki, Latikka, 
& Ryynanen, 1998; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002a). Consequently, it is 
harder to opt out of such an accepted and expected routine without appearing 
“difficult” or “uncooperative” (Press & Browner, 1997; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 
2002a). This situation further erodes the validity of any consent given and calls into 
question the notion of choice, when clearly, no alternative is offered (Lippman, 1999). 
In addition, the adoption of certain existing protocols as reflecting the ‘normal’ routine 
then complicates the issue of consent, as what is normal in a standardised sense 
and normal in an ethically prescriptive sense become confused. Once entrenched, 
the new normative routine becomes the accepted benchmark, and no further 
consideration is given to the expedient way these protocols evolved. Hence the 
power dynamics implicit within the institutional frameworks remain unacknowledged. 
In addition to the routine-ness of testing the inclusion of newer tests such as the 
maternal serum triple test (MSAFP) under the rubric of an older established antenatal 
routine (i.e. taking blood samples in an ante-natal clinic), has further blurred the 
principles of consent and voluntary choice, as the starkly different clinical aims of 
each blood test may not be clearly differentiated by some women (Kenen, 1996; 
Press & Browner, 1997).  
 
  
Overt /Covert Counselling  
 
 
While the nature of patient/doctor or patient/counsellor interaction in prenatal 
screening is idealised as being non-directive and non coercive (Anderson, 1999), the 
potential  to exert influence is widely recognised by health professionals who 
acknowledge the difficulties in maintaining a neutral, non- coercive approach . One 
midwife interviewed by Williams’ et al (2002) remarked, 
 
“If you offer it in such a way that it may not be such a negative thing to have 
a baby with Down’s, then it may not be….you may get someone else who 
through past experiences may offer it in a different way, so we have got an 
incredible amount of power in that relationship” (ibid) 
 
This sentiment is further re-enforced by a paediatrician who commented, 
 
“But then, sometimes, I have had the feeling that people, I wouldn’t say are 
pressurised, but that they are not necessarily given a realistic idea of what 
the outlook will be for their unborn child, that too black a picture may be 
painted, and maybe by people who don’t actually know themselves.” (Ibid) 
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These comments elucidate some of the issues associated with trying to dispense 
unbiased, value neutral advice in a non-directive way. For many the mere offer of a 
test will be viewed as a tacit recommendation (Press & Browner, 1997; Williams, 
Alderson, & Farsides, 2002a), while the presentation of a diagnosis predefined as 
undesirable (Kenen, 1999) encodes a subtle but insidious inference about the value 
of the child in question. 
 
Women in Stapleton’s (2002) study were rarely observed asking questions in 
deference to constraints on their doctor’s time, while hierarchal power structures 
within the medical administration were found to influence the array of options 
presented (Anderson, 1999; Bernhardt, Geller, Doksum, Larson, Roter, & Holtzman, 
1998; Stapleton, Kirkham, & Thomas, 2002; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002a). 
It should also be noted that a direct recommendation by a doctor might not 
necessarily erode patient autonomy as some patients’ request direction, preferring to 
make decisions with unambiguous advice. Although most women surveyed (75%) felt 
“the right amount” of time had been devoted to dialogue concerning the purpose and 
nature of testing (Bernhardt, Geller, Doksum et al., 1998), most conversations 
observed focused only on the physical practicalities of the test. The possible outcome 
of abortion or descriptions of the disorders being screened for occurred in a minority 
of cases while debate of any emotional, social or ethical aspects of screening were 
neglected (Bernhardt, Geller, Doksum et al., 1998; Press & Browner, 1993; 
Santalahti, 1999). This failure to regard these issues as worthy of discussion further 
undermines their relevance and may act, indirectly, as form of silencing, highlighting 
again the problem with a process in which what information is deemed to be ethically 
relevant is determined by another. 
 
 
Trust in the Medical System, Science and Technology 
 
A further consideration influencing ‘autonomous’ decision-making is faith and trust in 
the medical system, science and technology, with technology being identified as 
delivering solutions to problems. As such it is viewed as a valuable tool, almost a 
form of insurance towards producing a healthy child (Kenen, 1996). To understand 
the context in which these events occur we must examine the seductive power of 
“science” on which medicine is based, and acknowledge its’ prestigious position in 
society. It is seductive in that the notion of an infallible, authoritative solution (Noble, 
1999) that is readily revealed by the application of a simple test is clearly very 
appealing as it reduces the need to consider the more complex human dimensions of 
a problem. This scientific orientation brings with it a commitment to technology and 
consequently medical care is increasingly driven by what parameters technology can 
measure, though not necessarily what patients want to know (Sherwin, 1992). 
Hence, there emerges an ever expanding litany of tests being added to the prenatal 
regime, MSAFP, nuchal translucency, amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling, to 
name a few. The power of medicine then lies in its ability to expertly interpret this 
exclusive and complex scientific world, from the vantage point of the “specialist”. The 
consequence of this orientation however is that the non-expert (patient) contribution 
and confidence is undermined, leaving many uncomfortable and underqualified to 
participate in such complex deliberations. The scientific orientation of medicine then 
creates a distance between itself and those it practices upon entrenching 
paternalistic processes with their inherent reluctance to share power (Sherwin, 1992). 
How would an “unqualified” woman who rejects (or even questions) the hegemonic 
power of science be regarded within a context where technology is presented as 
progressive, desirable and infallible? In this context, going against the tide of 
expertise and authority would simply not be an option for many.  
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Finally, fear of potential litigation against medical staff rather than genuine patient 
need may be contributing to strong recommendations to participate given by many 
doctors (Anderson, 1999; Press & Browner, 1997; Stapleton, Kirkham, & Thomas, 
2002; Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002b). This represents a different form of 
reassurance, one sought by medical staff, mindful of avoiding possible lawsuits 
(Williams, Alderson, & Farsides, 2002a) . Indeed, the  “legal grey area of malpractice 
for not offering tests” (italics added) has been identified as a factor in the increasing 
numbers of women being offered the MSAFP blood test in the USA (Press & 
Browner, 1997). Hence, a mutually reinforcing bond of trust between specialist and 
patient is formed which effectively masks any authentic exercising of patient 
autonomy. 
 
  
Social Constraints 
 
 
 Social Pressure, Responsibility and Blame 
 
 
Additional forms of social pressure impacting on a woman’s ability to freely decide, 
include expectations of “responsible pregnant behaviour”, which presume women will 
engage in risk lowering behaviours that ensure their child’s safety (Lippman, 1991). 
Expectations range from innocuous behaviours such as giving up soft cheese to 
engaging in potentially harmful forms of prenatal screening such as CVS or 
amniocentesis (ibid). Many respondents felt under immense pressure from family and 
friends to terminate an affected foetus within the often-restricted time frame between 
a diagnosis and the legally acceptable gestational limit for termination of 20 weeks. 
(Helm, Miranda , & Ched 1998 cited by Bridle 2002). Frequently, this time pressure 
limited opportunity for reflection, assimilation of information and understanding of 
options, which are requirements of authentic informed consent.  
 
Other forms of social pressure include the ongoing public discussion of the cost of 
supporting the disabled. This raising of the moral imperative to conserve public funds 
may further exert pressure on women to view termination as the only socially 
responsible outcome. Indeed Williams et al. (2002) reiterate this point revealing that 
many respondents in their recent study viewed screening as an “economic solution to 
the ‘problem’ of disability”.  
 
Poor understanding of disability 
 
The prevention of pain, anxiety, stress and suffering of the disabled and their carers 
is often cited as a positive outcome of early termination of a disabled foetus 
(Anderson, 1999; Baird, 1999; Clarkeburn, 2000). Clarkeburn (2000) goes further 
claiming that it is not only beneficial, but “a parental and moral obligation” to prevent 
a child being born whose life would be “worse than non-existence”. While the 
argument that life is worse than death for the severely disabled is disputed as a 
socially constructed interpretation, entrenched by the portrayal of disability as an 
unrelenting tragedy (Bridle 2001; Ferguson, Gartner, & Lipsky, 2000), it is a message 
that pregnant women receive (Lippman, 1991).This message is further entrenched by 
the visible and experienced lack of support  in the community, accentuated in recent 
years by a social policy shift which now lays the “burden of care” squarely in the 
hands of the community, and out of the hands of institutions. So, as the option to 
institutionalise a dependant child with a disability is removed, a stark choice confronts 
parents, confirming the difficulties of coping with disability in an under resourced 
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world. Given that much of the pain, anxiety and stress experienced by the disabled 
and their carers directly results from lack of social and governmental support, not 
from the disability per se, (Ferguson, Gartner, & Lipsky, 2000), many parents of 
children with disabilities feel  it is unreasonable to judge quality of life based on an a 
social norm in which the disabled are under resourced and misrepresented. As 
Shakespeare (2001) remarks 
 
“While I support a woman’s right to choose, I regret situations where a 
pregnancy is terminated because of inaccurate or prejudiced information 
about what it is like to be disabled” (Shakespeare, 2001 cited by ALRC, 2001 
p 38)  
 
So, as women identify themselves as advocates for their child’s health they take 
responsibility to act towards ensuring their child’s best interests (Lippman, 1999). But 
this sense of responsibility may lead to women feeling culpable or blamed by society 
if their decision not to co-operate leads to a “negative outcome”, i.e., an undetected 
disabled child. (Marteau & Drake, 1995). The different and often conflicting 
responsibilities of parenting, partnering and the social responsibility to avoid the 
potential financial and emotional hardship of raising a child with high medical needs 
has been found to contribute to feelings of confusion and guilt expressed by many 
women (Lippman, 1999). Consequently a very real awareness of a social pressure to 
participate in prenatal screening programmes is felt. 
 
 
The Future – Developing An Alternative Framework. 
 
 
Clearly, the mechanical incorporation of the values of consent, informed consent and 
autonomy within current protocols is proving an inadequate platform from which to 
build ethically coherent responses to the complex issues faced. This is because the 
current practices do not respond to the social context of how decisions are made or 
accommodate the particularities of individual cases and because they fail to provide 
an opportunity for genuine understanding to occur.  As the landscape of prenatal 
screening changes inevitably towards more medicalised pregnancies existing 
protocols are rapidly becoming irrelevant therefore the way informed consent is 
achieved needs to be re-assessed. We know that increased technological 
sophistication requires increasingly complex understanding therefore a change in the 
nature of how knowledge is developed in the context of pregnancy must be affected. 
 
The Educative Dimension 
 
As previously discussed, a key component of informed consent is the capacity to 
understand and gain knowledge about the treatment process and options available 
prior to testing (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). For informed consent to be given, 
information and understanding is required, indeed, unless a person has deep 
understanding they cannot act freely, another tenet of informed consent. We also 
know from recent research that understanding is not being achieved by existing 
protocols for the multitude of reasons discussed throughout this paper. Clearly 
current regimes are failing to meet their ethical objectives. Indeed in its present 
incarnation, the ethical dimension has become reduced to more a technical aim or 
“bureaucratic procedure essential to mass production of services” than an 
opportunity to engage in any meaningful ethical discussion (Caplan , cited by Urban - 
Walker, 1993).  As it currently stands, informed consent has primarily become a legal 
requirement and as such minimum conditions reflecting minimal accountability before 
the law have become the acceptable standard. However the dangers that exist in 
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collapsing the ethical into the legal are emerging as the separate legal and moral 
aims become enmeshed. 
 
An initial step in creating an educationally transformative environment would be to 
remove considerations of the ethical dimensions of screening from the clinical 
setting. The clinical setting is primarily one of identifying problems and providing 
treatment, not education, hence, a clash of purpose exists. Clinically, the aim of 
screening is to isolate and treat disease, not provide a reflective learning space for 
patients. The urgent and often pressurised environment, tight resourcing, time 
restrictions and requirement for quick decisions all combine to stifle the learning 
experiences that nurture a genuine understanding necessary for informed consent. 
Therefore, a move to a more appropriate responsive space outside of the restricted 
clinical setting is required, a space where an ongoing, dynamic process of dialogue, 
collaboration and negotiation can be facilitated.  
 
Cognitive theory shows us that the complexity of learning is not reflected in the 
current practice of bioethics. Generally it is assumed that the patient is a mirror 
hence there is no acknowledgment of prior learning or existing interpretive frames. 
Information is transmitted by health care workers and received by patients. However 
appealing this pedagogy is, educationally it falls well short of the conditions required 
to achieve deeper learning – hence make informed decisions. As each person brings 
his or her own interpretive frameworks to these interactions, new information is 
differentially prioritised and attention is focused on what each person deems to be 
critical information. Thus each woman will bring pre-existing values and perceptions 
to the process. In the context of screening this means that there is not a universal 
right or wrong outcome, but rather a spectrum of individual responses that reflect 
individual experience. But present practice does not respond to these differences. 
 
An educational programme must be developed that goes beyond reducing the ethical 
component to the handing out of leaflets or the rushed chat with a busy midwife or 
obstetrician. A response, which is sympathetic to the cultural, institutional and 
personal contexts of screening. Perhaps future ethical encounters may take the 
shape of the already familiar antenatal class, which instead of dealing with physical 
well-being will address issues of ethical, moral and social well-being? Given that 
informed consent is a continuous variable, not a dichotomous one a structure such 
as this would keep moral – reflective spaces open within institutional frameworks 
while each woman’s emotional, physical and knowledge status evolves. What is clear 
is that an ethical commitment requires us to move beyond considering the ethical 
contours of this problem to develop a transforming educative dimension within the 
institutional setting. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Although references to informed consent and autonomy are liberally scattered 
through the medical discourse, in reality, a person’s ability to exercise truly 
autonomous choice is restricted by multiple social, institutional and personal factors. 
When combined with the real lack of access to any educational experience during the 
consent process prior to the granting of ‘informed consent ’ the ethical integrity of 
currently accepted regimes becomes compromised. Currently accepted protocols 
have resulted in the overall ethical legitimisation of the established health care 
routines, while deeper concerns about inherent injustices, lack of understanding and 
failures have remained largely unacknowledged. Therefore as the trend to embrace 
new technologies continues with the inclusion of genetic testing the dilemma of how 
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to facilitate meaningful and ethically sound engagement that responds to the 
educative needs of patients will continue to grow. The incorporation of education 
programmes into prenatal routines prior to screening may provide some answers. 
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